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Executive summary 
The cost of procuring pharmaceutical products – especially medicines – represents a major 
share of public health spending. At the same time, the significant financial resources and the 
number of players involved in pharmaceutical procurement makes the process susceptible to 
corrupt practices. Such corruption in the public sector can potentially lead to cost escalations 
without a commensurate improvement in health outcomes.  
There is a particular gap in understanding corrupt practices relevant to the procurement of 
medicines in Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa. Greater understanding is needed of the different 
types of corrupt practices that occur in the pharmaceuticals procurement chain, their drivers 
and effects, and steps that could be taken to reduce corruption and improve accountability 
and efficiency. This report synthesises the relevant evidence that has been published to date. 
We retrieved and conducted a detailed review of 54 publications comprising grey and primary 
literature. The baseline year was 2008. Specific search terms were used to explore various 
databases and search engines such as Google, Google Scholar, Pub Med, Directory of Open 
Access Journals, Science Direct, Hinari and ResearchGate.  
Most of the publications focus on Nigeria (38), while 16 of them explore other Anglophone 
sub-Saharan African countries. Many of the papers explore the challenges in procurement of 
pharmaceuticals without clearly distinguishing incidences of corruption from inefficiencies or 
irregularities. However, the implied motive is to secure private gain. Common corrupt 
behaviours include: influencing the bidding process to secure supply contracts, procuring 
unnecessary drugs and equipment, bribery and kickbacks to grow pharmaceutical orders, and 
drug theft and sales. The common effects of these practices include: frequent stock-outs, the 
supply of sub-standard drugs and associated loss of lives, reduced effectiveness of treatment, 
lost opportunity costs for legitimate companies and wasted funds. The substantial amount of 
money involved in pharmaceutical procurement is identified in the literature as the foremost 
driver of corruption. Other drivers include weak administrative systems, low pay among 
procurement staff and information asymmetry.  
We found a dearth of evidence on interventions to tackle corruption, which implies that 
pharma corruption in the region has continued largely unchecked. However, many of the 
studies suggest multiple approaches that could be used to tackle corrupt practices alongside 
other irregularities. Some of the interventions are specific to some types of drugs and others 
suggest the use of innovative approaches. A few positive anti-corruption cases are described in 
countries where the Medicine Transparency Alliance (MeTA) is operational, and where open 
contracting and outsourcing are used when corruption is rife. Drawing on the evidence 
reviewed and the SOAS Anti-Corruption Evidence approach, we recommend that anti-
corruption efforts are aligned through a coalition among governments, pharmaceutical 
companies, the media and civil society organisations (CSOs), with appropriate checks and 
balances to establish an anti-corruption agenda in the pharmaceutical procurement chain. We 
highlight useful mechanisms that actors within this coalition can adopt.   
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1. Introduction 
The procurement of pharmaceuticals within public health systems involves substantial 
financial resources. The sums amount to almost 25–50% of global public health spending, 
just below the cost of employing and maintaining the health workforce (Amin, 2017; 
Heggstad and Froystad, 2011). Added to these vast financial resources, the complex 
coalitions and the numbers of players involved (with diverse interests) make the 
procurement process prone to corruption (Diack et al., 2010) and an area of major concern 
in the health sector (Amin, 2017; Heggstad and Froystad, 2011).   
Procurement in this context is described as a process of acquiring medical consumables and 
equipment from pharmaceutical companies for the benefit of end-users (Mubangizi and 
Sewpersadh, 2017). The procurement chain involves manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, 
drug stores, dispensing doctors, and public and private pharmacies, etc. (Kanavos and 
Wouters, 2014); and the processes include bidding/tendering, evaluation/selection, award 
and purchasing, licensing, distribution, promotion and contract management (Cohen et al., 
2007). Prescribing, dispensing and even clinical trials could also be considered part of 
procurement, because these processes influence what is bought and sold to end-users.  
The procurement of medicines revolves around questions of what to buy, from whom, at 
what price and for which end-users (Amin, 2007). Taken together, this has made the 
pharmaceutical procurement chain overly complex, difficult to study and vulnerable to 
corruption that depends on political economy dynamics which remain undetected at times. 
‘Good’ pharmaceutical procurement ensures the ‘restriction of purchases to the essential 
medicines list (national formulary list), determination of order quantities based on reliable 
needs estimation, competitive tendering from qualified suppliers, separation of key 
functions, prompt payment, regular audits, and a formal system of supplier qualification and 
monitoring’ (Management Sciences for Health, 2012: Ch.1).  
The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that around only 20% of countries in the 
world have good procurement practices – countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
underperform (Olugbenga, 2014), which Yadav (2015) suggests is a result of corruption in 
the pharmaceutical procurement chain. Consequently, SSA countries struggle to procure the 
right product, at the right quality and quantity, and at a cost-effective price (UNDP, 2011). 
And these failings occur despite the huge sums of money involved. In Nigeria, for instance, 
the pharmaceutical sector constitutes about 2% (N1.109 trillion) of the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) and about N300 billion in investments; it employs over 600,000 
people and is valued at over US$800 million with yearly growth of 12% (Siyanbola et al., 
2012). The impact of rising medicine prices as a result of corruption is felt by end-users but it 
also inflates government spending (Kanavos and Wouters, 2014).  
This study seeks to enhance understanding of the nature and types of corruption in 
pharmaceutical procurement in low- and middle-income countries – and SSA in particular – 
and the drivers, impacts and potential remedial measures. It builds on a previous systematic 
review of corruption in Anglophone health systems in which pharmaceutical procurement is 
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identified as susceptible to corruption (Onwujekwe et al., 2019). The literature indicates that 
such corruption largely occurs in the demand and supply chain for medicines (Heggstad and 
Froystad, 2011). Manufacturers, government agencies and selection committees in charge of 
tenders and bid protocols, wholesalers, representatives of pharmaceutical companies, 
pharmacists and medical staff are all implicated in the web of corruption (Chuku et al., 2016; 
Cohen et al., 2007). Furthermore, the numerous parties involved in the pharma 
procurement process make the system overly complex and difficult to monitor, such that 
most corrupt practices are hidden (Cartwright and Baric, 2018; Ekeigwe, 2019; Enyinda and 
Tolliver, 2009; Olugbenga, 2013).  
This report synthesises the evidence on potential corrupt practices and solutions in the 
procurement of pharmaceuticals in Anglophone SSA. The investigation seeks to identify new 
areas for research, policy debate and action, and pulls together recommended strategies to 
make pharma procurement systems more efficient and offer better value for money. 
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2. Methodology  
We retrieved and conducted a critical review of 54 publications comprising grey and primary 
literature. We focused on Anglophone SSA (i.e. English-speaking countries) because this has 
not been covered by any previous review (see Figure 1 for countries covered). We included 
both qualitative and quantitative studies published in English (or with English translation) 
during the period 2008–2020. Search terms were used to explore various databases and 
search engines such as Google, Google Scholar, Pub Med, Directory of Open Access Journals, 
Science Direct, Hinari and ResearchGate. Apart from the literature generated by the Boolean 
operators, we also followed up on references of interest in the reviewed papers. Some of 
the papers have findings relevant to more than one country, hence the disparity in some of 
the figures. See Box 1 for the Boolean operators used for the literature search. 
We categorised our findings into the nature and types, consequences and drivers of 
pharmaceutical procurement corruption, plus strategies that have been used to curb such 
corruption. Our findings discussed in Section 3 reflect these categories. 
Figure 1: Language map for Africa 
 
Source: Adapted from Africa Leadership Study (2019). 
Corruption in the procurement of pharmaceuticals in Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa: a scoping literature review 
8 
Box 1: Literature search terms 
((“Nature” OR “Drivers” OR “Effects”) AND (“Corruption” OR “Bribery” OR “Dishonesty” OR 
“Inefficient practices” OR “Rent seeking” OR “Informal payment”) AND (“Health sector” OR 
“Hospital” OR “Healthcare center” OR “Health facilities” OR “Health service”) AND 
(“pharmaceuticals” OR “drugs” OR “medical supplies” OR “essential medicine” ) AND 
(“Health worker” OR “Service provider”) AND ( (“Sub-Saharan Africa”) OR OR (“Botswana”) 
OR (“Eritrea”) OR (“Ethiopia”) OR (“Ghana”) OR (“Kenya”) OR (“Lesotho”) OR (“Liberia”) OR 
(“Malawi”) OR (“Namibia”) OR (“Nigeria”) OR (“Rwanda”) OR (“Tanzania”) OR (“Sierra 
Leone”) OR (“South Sudan”) OR (“Uganda”) OR (“South Africa”) OR (“Zambia”) OR 
(“Zimbabwe”)) 
((“Open contracting” OR “Procurement” OR “tender” OR “bidding” OR “purchasing” OR 
“purchasing equipment”) AND (“pharmaceuticals” OR “drugs” OR “medical supplies” OR 
“essential medicine”) AND (“healthcare” OR “health sector” OR “hospital” OR “health 
service”) AND ( (“Sub-Saharan Africa”) OR (“Botswana”) OR (“Eritrea”) OR (“Ethiopia”) OR 
(“Ghana”) OR (“Kenya”) OR (“Lesotho”) OR (“Liberia”) OR (“Malawi”) OR (“Namibia”) OR 
(“Nigeria”) OR (“Rwanda”) OR (“Tanzania”) OR (“Sierra Leone”) OR (“South Sudan”) OR 
(“Uganda”) OR (“South Africa”) OR (“Zambia”) OR (“Zimbabwe”)) 
((“Anti-corruption” OR “Combating corruption” OR “Tackle corruption” OR “Prevent 
corruption” OR “Anti-corruptive government” OR “Transparency” OR “Intervention” OR 
“Measures” OR “Strategies”) AND (“Health sector” OR “Hospital” OR “Healthcare center” 
OR “Health facilities” OR “Health service”) AND (“pharmaceutical” OR “pharmaceutical 
procurement” OR “medical supplies” OR “drugs” OR “essential medicine”) AND ( (“Sub-
Saharan Africa”) OR OR (“Botswana”) OR (“Eritrea”) OR (“Ethiopia”) OR (“Ghana”) OR 
(“Kenya”) OR (“Lesotho”) OR (“Liberia”) OR (“Malawi”) OR (“Namibia”) OR (“Nigeria”) OR 
(“Rwanda”) OR (“Tanzania”) OR (“Sierra Leone”) OR (“South Sudan”) OR (“Uganda”) OR 
(“South Africa”) OR (“Zambia”) OR (“Zimbabwe”)).  
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3. Findings 
Studies on corruption in the pharmaceutical sector are well represented in the literature, 
demonstrating the nature and types, consequences, and drivers of pharmaceutical 
corruption in SSA. Countries from sub-regions of East, West and Southern Africa are 
highlighted in the documents reviewed. While some studies focus on one or more types of 
pharmaceutical procurement corruption, others identify pharmaceutical procurement 
corruption among other types of corruption happening in a country or in the health sector.  
Annex Table A1 shows the types of corruption that have been reported in different SSA 
countries, while Annex Table A2 shows the percentage distribution of country-by-country 
literature and key findings. Remarkably, 38 of the documents reviewed highlight 
pharmaceutical procurement corruption in Nigeria. Other countries include Ghana (11), 
South Africa (7), Uganda (5), Tanzania (4), Kenya and Sierra Leone (2 each), Ethiopia, 
Botswana and Rwanda (1 each). One paper (Aminu and Gwarzo, 2017) discusses common 
types of corruption in pharmaceutical procurement across several SSA countries (explaining 
an interconnected range of practices that compromise the procurement process).  
Table A1 also captures the underlying drivers of procurement corruption in the sector, with 
the key drivers being opportunities for rent-capture, health systems weakened by an 
absence of policy or poor enforcement of policies/regulations, infrastructural deficits and 
poor remuneration of staff. Interestingly, we also found studies that evaluate interventions 
aimed at combatting the various types of corruption in different countries: such evaluative 
studies on anti-corruption measures are usually rare to find in the literature. Finally, some of 
the studies proffer and/or investigate interventions to address certain procurement 
challenges.  
3.1. The nature and types of corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement   
Corruption in pharma procurement varies across the different Anglophone SSA countries 
owing to differing anti-corruption protocols and measures (Baghdadi-Sabedi and Serhan, 
2010). Corrupt behaviour occurs at different decision-points in the procurement chain in 
each country (pre-tendering, tendering/decision-making and award/post-award phases) 
(Heggstad and Froystad, 2011). However, in SSA, the types of corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement are similar because countries in the region face similar governance problems 
(Bigdeli et al., 2013). For instance, kickbacks, procurement of expensive drugs, theft, and the 
resale of drugs and medical equipment are mentioned in studies in countries like Sierra 
Leone (Mostert et al., 2015), Nigeria (Chuku et al., 2016), Ghana (Heggstad and Froystad, 
2011) and South Africa (Mantzaris & Pillay, 2018). USAID (2013) also highlights lack of 
transparency in budgeting processes and procurement, as well as in tender and 
procurement processes, as being common in pharmaceutical procurement in SSA.  
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Among the several types of corruption in pharma procurement, the major practices include: 
bribery and extortion between pharmaceutical companies, their agents and frontline 
practitioners in hospitals and members of selection committees in the procurement chain 
(Chattopadhyay, 2013; Heggstad and Froystad, 2011; Mackey and Liang, 2012; Open Briefing, 
2013; UNDP, 2011); bid rigging (Amin, 2017; Cohen et al., 2007; Mackey and Liang, 2012; 
UNDP, 2011); market division (Heggstad and Froystad, 2011), which featured strongly in 
Nigeria and Ghana; falsification of bidding and supply documents (Cartwright and Baric, 2018; 
Heggstad and Froystad, 2011), which featured in Nigeria and Ghana; conflict of interests 
(members of the selection committees and procurement staff also bid for contracts, 
sometimes through proxies), which featured in Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda (Baghdadi and 
Serhan, 2010; Garuba et al., 2009; Ntayi et al., 2013); incorrect quantification, which featured 
in Nigeria (Management Sciences for Health, 2012: Ch.1); closed contracting and avoidance of 
e-procurement procedures, which featured in Nigeria (Amin, 2017; Arney et al., 2014); and 
state capture by powerful suppliers, which featured in Nigeria (Diack et al., 2010; Olugbenga, 
2013). But these different types of corruption are driven by several conditions that overlap at 
times. For instance, a member of procurement staff who bids for contracts could offer bribes 
not to be exposed; a pharma company could offer bribes to the procurement staff in a hospital 
to inflate the quantity of drugs to be supplied; and a pharma company could lobby for the 
rejection of a competitor in a bid in order to capture the market.  
In the next sub-sections, we elaborate on the various types of corruption and the conditions 
under which they occur. 
3.1.1. Bribery and extortion 
Local and foreign companies offer bribes to selection committees to include them in bids, to 
include their products in essential medicines lists or to increase their chances of winning 
contracts to supply medicines. This has been observed in Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa 
(Open Briefing, 2013; UNDP, 2011). Specifically, in countries like Nigeria and Ghana, it has 
been reported that companies offer bribes to have their products deceitfully passed through 
clinical trials meant to certify that products are fit for consumption (Egharevba and Atkinson, 
2016; Open Briefing, 2013). Bribes are also offered to secure licenses, for promotion of specific 
products over others and to the media to make favourable reports of products, results of 
clinical trials and bidding outcomes (Bigdeli et al., 2013). In Ghana, companies reportedly 
experience extortion by officials who threaten that applications will not be considered or that 
their licences will be withdrawn/revoked (Heggstad and Froystad, 2011). According to Amin 
(2017), bribery and extortion is rampant because the processes of pharmaceutical 
procurement involve dealings between procurement officials and pharma reps.  
3.1.2. Bid rigging 
Public Procurement Acts in most SSA countries advocate for competitive bidding, which 
implies that all companies have an equal chance of selection (Mubangizi and Sewpersadh, 
2017). However, the literature review shows evidence of some actors influencing bid 
assessments in countries like Ghana, where procurement officials are offered bribes to make 
bid assessments favourable to some bidders and not others (Cohen et al., 2007; Heggstad 
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and Froystad, 2011). The bidding process can also be rigged to favour bidders on the 
grounds of social networks of friendship, kinship or nepotism (Cohen et al., 2007; Mubangizi 
and Sewpersadh, 2017), which denies qualified bidders fair assessment. Officials deploy 
several means to ensure that the bidding process favours their preferred bidder, including 
cutting short the time for submission of paperwork, deliberately misplacing the applications 
of government bidders, modifying certain criteria to suit a preferred company, favouring 
some companies with information, manipulation of bid scores, and using extortion to scare 
off unfavourable bidders (Arney and Yadav, 2014; Heggstad and Froystad, 2011).  
A different type of corruption, called bid suppression or complementary bidding has also 
been reported in Ghana (Heggstad and Froystad, 2011). This involves an understanding 
between bidders to allow for a single submission, behind which they all throw their weight. 
At the end of the bidding process, those who shielded their bids are sub-contracted or 
offered kickbacks (ibid.). More so, this practice creates the opportunity for bidders to form a 
cartel to regulate prices and production, which runs contrary to public interest. 
3.1.3. Other types of corruption 
Other, less common, types of corruption that have been reported within the pharma 
procurement system include: falsification of documents by bidders and their assessors 
(Heggstad and Froystad, 2011); incorrect quantification of drugs to be supplied so 
procurement officials and pharmaceutical companies benefit financially (Management 
Sciences for Health, 2012: Ch. 1); conflict of interests involving procurement officials who 
clandestinely bid for awards or protect a favoured bid (Baghdadi and Serhan, 2010; Garuba 
et al., 2009); and powerful suppliers who capture the state, thereby dictating who gets what, 
when and how (reported in the Nigerian literature by Diack et al., 2010; Olugbenga, 2014).  
3.2. The consequences of corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
There are several key impacts of pharmaceutical procurement corruption. Bribes, extortion, 
kickbacks and conflicts of interest undermine transparency, equity and fair judgement in 
deciding who wins a contract to supply pharmaceuticals (Chuku et al., 2016; Peresson, 
2019). They result in a loss of accountability and foster a permissive culture for other types 
of corruption like forgery, inflation of supplier figures and prices, and delisting of qualified 
bidders, to mention a few. The resultant effects include avoidable spending on the part of 
government, infiltration of sub-standard and low-quality medicines into the system, inflated 
prices for medicines, and lack of opportunities for patients to evaluate medicines in terms of 
quality, effectiveness and cost. And these consequences will continue so long as profiteering 
and pecuniary benefits persist (Diack et al., 2010; Olugbenga, 2014).      
Other consequences of bribery include impeded access to quality medicines due to exorbitant 
prices, frequent stock-outs, hoarding, inappropriate prescribing and, generally speaking, a sub-
optimal healthcare system (Bigdeli et al., 2013; Cartwright and Baric, 2018; Management 
Sciences for Health, 2012: Ch.1; Mostert et al., 2015). As officials collect bribes and kickbacks 
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to influence the procurement process, pharmaceutical companies are hardly held accountable 
when they influence contracting agreements (Tormusa and Idom, 2016). This results in high-
cost and low-quality supply and biased distribution. Sadly, when prices of medicines soar and 
become relatively unaffordable for many, it is poor people who are affected most. They are 
less able to pay for medicines and may shun treatment completely or turn to alternative 
treatments that can be detrimental to their health and increase mortality (Kamorudeen and 
Bidemi, 2012). The implication of this is certainly grave, as the acquisition of rents is obviously 
elevated above protecting the health and wellbeing of the population. 
As a result of information asymmetry, healthcare service users find it difficult to investigate 
the medicines they purchase, particularly in terms of quality or cost, because the healthcare 
provider assumes a monopoly of knowledge in prescribing (Amadi and Tsui, 2018; Kanavos 
and Wouters, 2014; Tormusa and Idom, 2016). Service users are also made to believe that a 
pharmacist is dispensing the right medicine and ask no questions, even when patients are 
faced with a financial burden and ineffective medicines. We found no system in place that 
monitors patients’ rights to drug information, thus, individuals remain at the mercy of 
doctors and pharmacists. It is during this process that patients may become victims of 
inappropriate prescribing, and doctors and pharmacists may enjoy kickbacks from pharma 
companies whose interests they protect.   
Another key consequence of corruption is that it erodes trust in systems (Onwujekwe et al., 
2020). The pharma sector should benefit from research on the best drug therapies, as well 
as commitment to enforce rules and best practices in the procurement chain. However, 
researchers may be discouraged from applying their efforts to a corrupt system, since they 
may never be funded or recognised, or their efforts could become compromised along the 
way (Siyanbola et al., 2012). Also, enforcers of rules and best practices can be discouraged 
and become demotivated, and potential suppliers with good intents could be corruptly 
excluded from the procurement chain. The latter can lead to suppliers participating in 
corrupt behaviour for their business to survive or to them losing trust in the system (Open 
Briefing, 2013; Oyebamiji, 2018).  
3.3. The drivers of corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
Procurement units within public health facilities are considered vulnerable to corruption 
because of the large sums of money involved and the complex relationships among those 
who control the procurement process (Huff-Rousselle, 2012). Rent-seeking is perhaps the 
most recognisable driver of procurement corruption. As public hospitals are likely to make 
large orders with large associated financial flows, businesses are attracted to the sector to 
seek contracts. The quest for rent capture attracts many players who use both legitimate 
and illegitimate means to secure procurement contracts. Bribes and kickbacks are offered to 
officials who are connected to the bidding process, and likewise officials demand bribes to 
offer information to bidders or to help influence the award of contracts. When an 
appropriate procurement process is not followed, opportunities are created for other types 
Corruption in the procurement of pharmaceuticals in Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa: a scoping literature review 
13 
of corruption, including erroneous quantification of drugs or orders and irregular receipt and 
storage processes at medical stores (Ekeigwe, 2019).  
Mostert et al. (2015) identify the sole authority of government to regulate the procurement 
process as one of the drivers of corruption. In the absence of oversight from independent 
bodies, private citizens or CSOs, government officials determine which medicines are 
procured and the quantities needed, thus creating an opportunity for officials to benefit 
financially through kickbacks, overbilling and all manner of graft. With no counterchecks in 
place, public officials can abuse their positions without detection or fear of sanctions. 
The literature also reports agents of pharmaceutical companies who take advantage of 
inexperienced government officers (Bah-Traore, 2012; Mostert et al., 2015). Such 
unqualified persons who work in the procurement and distribution of drugs are easily 
influenced or undermined because they are unfamiliar with the correct processes. This 
creates room for procurement irregularities (Vian, 2008). Low salaries are also often 
recognised as the reason why officials demand and collect bribes to supplement their 
monthly salary in countries like Nigeria (Garuba et al., 2009; Mackey and Liang, 2012; 
Tormusa and Idom, 2016). 
Furthermore, Vian (2008) describes the administrative systems in poorer countries as often 
weak. These inadequacies make it difficult to measure corruption statistics such as the 
percentage of procurements that have not met certain standards and to track corruption 
incidences within the sector. Both of these measures are needed for ‘red-flagging’ and for 
the proposal of relevant interventions (Amnesty International, 2011). Vian (ibid.) goes on to 
argue that perpetrators of corruption are driven by individual motivations and values, hence 
the need to also address the sense of ethics and social values within a particular context. 
Corruption in the procurement of pharmaceuticals has also been linked to certain 
demographic attributes like marital status and gender (ibid.).  
Finally, information asymmetry has been identified as a driver of corruption in the 
pharmaceutical procurement process (Chuku et al., 2016). This happens when certain 
players in the procurement chain have some form of informational advantage over end-
users (Cohen et al., 2007; Olugbenga, 2013). For example, this information could relate to 
pricing, drug descriptions, prescriptions, legislation, regulations and constituents of the 
essential medicines list. Therefore, a transparent flow of information in non-technical 
language regarding the pharma system as a whole can help bridge the gap between the 
public and representatives of the pharmaceutical sector (Yadav, 2015). In this way, the 
public can identify incidences of corruption and act to protect their own interests, and 
procurement officials and bid winners will be kept accountable, given public awareness. It 
should be noted, however, that even in the presence of information flows, powerful political 
coalitions can still capture rents if enforcement capacity is low. 
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3.4. Existing strategies to curb pharmaceutical 
procurement corruption in Anglophone SSA  
Anti-corruption interventions have been implemented or recommended in particular 
contexts, although the literature shows that the complex nature of the pharma procurement 
chain poses a challenge for the success of many interventions (Cartwright and Baric, 2018; 
Enyinda and Tolliver, 2009; Siyanbola et al., 2012).  
Local ownership of the procurement process 
Many countries in Anglophone SSA import large quantities of vital medicines, which makes 
them vulnerable to some compromising practices (Bah-Traore, 2012). Some authors opine 
that local manufacturing of medicines would make the chain less complex and easier to 
monitor, as well as reducing production costs that will ultimately affect mark-ups and the 
prices of medicines for end-users (Siyanbola et al., 2012; Conway et al., 2019). Some 
countries in Asia and North Africa that have improved their procurement system are 
referenced as examples of success as they are promoting the local manufacture of medicines 
(Conway et al., 2019).    
The transition of countries from low- to middle-income status has caused donors to reduce 
or withdraw aid, including medicines (Arney and Yadav, 2014). The implication is that these 
countries have to take charge of purchasing medicines and that they are ignorant of or 
inexperienced in the business of pharma procurement (Vian, 2008). To avoid vulnerability to 
corruption and exploitation, it has been recommended that closer collaborations are needed 
with countries that have successfully secured their own pharma procurement system (Arney 
et al., 2014). In this way, countries that have succeeded in establishing and managing their 
own procurement systems can mentor and coach those that are new to the business. 
Similarly, outsourcing procurement of medicines to international organisations has proven 
to be an effective strategy: for instance, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
procured medicines for Ukraine in 2015, when the Ministry of Health in the country was 
found to have betrayed confidence and public trust (Amin, 2017).  
Good governance and global benchmarks 
Good governance and political will can also lead to reduced corruption within the 
pharmaceutical procurement system (Tormusa and Idom, 2016). The WHO’s 2004 Good 
Governance for Medicines Programme could be helpful here (Baghdadi-Sabeti and Serhan, 
2010), which outlines how appropriate and weighty sanctions could be implemented and 
promotes ethics as a strong value for procurement officials (Chattopadhyay, 2013). Such ethics 
and sanctions were applied by Dora Akunyili, a former Director-General of the National Agency 
for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), which led to a reduction of 
counterfeit medicines in Nigeria by 80% between 2002 and 2006 (Garuba et al., 2009). 
Other measures have also been recommended to ensure there are no disparities between 
what is prescribed with what is in the essential medicines list and the WHO drug list (Yadav, 
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2015). A comparison of the prices of medicines against global benchmarks and between 
national essential medicines lists against WHO’s list has been found helpful (UNDP, 2011; 
Yadav, 2015; Open Briefing, 2013). This is mentioned because it has been observed that 
essential medicines lists have been tampered with by selection committees who take bribes 
from pharmaceutical companies (Cohen et al., 2007; Management Sciences for Health, 2012: 
Ch.1). The UNDP (2011) notes that the essential drugs list alone cannot curb corruption, 
however, and that this must be complemented with other anti-corruption interventions. 
Digitising procurement 
Additional interventions could involve the use of e-procurement systems and open 
contracting. Amin (2017) considers that the enforcement of a digital culture in pharma 
procurement would mean that bidders and procurement committees have limited 
interactions, which would reduce the opportunities for the exchange of bribes and extortion. 
In other words, there would be less opportunities for corruption due to limited human 
interaction (Amadi and Tsui, 2018; Mubangizi and Sewpersadh, 2017). Important areas for 
electronic intervention include calls for the submission of bids, tendering, payments and 
monitoring (Gebremariam and Unade, 2019). However, the effectiveness of e-procurement 
is yet to be ascertained – there are scarce empirical studies on e-procurement of 
pharmaceuticals, and on a general level the use of e-procurement in SSA is hindered by 
inadequate IT infrastructure and a weak legal environment (Sarpong et al., 2017a).  
Open contracting is also advocated by many (Amin, 2017; Hivos and Open Contracting 
Partnership, 2016; Peresson, 2019; Open Briefing, 2013), which ensures that no data related 
to the procurement process is hidden and that submissions from bidders, and information 
regarding the selection criteria and contracts are in the public domain (Baghdadi-Sabeti and 
Serhan, 2010).  
The role of the media and CSOs 
The involvement of certain stakeholders is important for eliminating corruption in 
procurement. The media and CSOs could help to increase transparency in the procurement 
process by ensuring that the general public have access to the right information and that 
interested bidders are not short-changed in the process. For example, it has been suggested 
that clear information campaigns could be communicated by the media regarding 
pharmaceutical procurement (Cohen et al., 2007; Enweremadu and Ifejika, 2017; 
Gebremariam and Unade, 2019). CSOs, on the other hand, could stand as watchdogs and 
work together with the media to advocate for better procurement systems and identify 
defaulters (Enweremadu and Ifejika, 2017). Amin (2017) sees CSOs as indispensable for a 
corruption-free pharmaceutical procurement system and advocates for a ‘golden triangle’ 
involving the government, businesses and CSOs. Given the important role it can play in 
stemming pharmaceutical corruption, we add the media as a fourth pillar to an effective 
anti-corruption strategy.  
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Other measures 
Some studies advocate for context-specific anti-corruption measures across the 
procurement chain (Enyinda and Tolliver, 2019; Webb, 2014) and suggest that corruption 
flashpoints should be identified across the chain so that specific anti-corruption approaches 
can be designed (Enyinda et al, 2010). Heggstad and Froystad (2011) believe that corruption 
occurs at the phases of pre-tendering, tendering/decision-making, and post-award phases, 
and so recommend that mitigation efforts should take into consideration these three phases 
more than others.  
Stiff penalties, including naming and shaming of defaulters, have also been recommended 
(Ekeigwe, 2019). This is the reason integrity pacts are signed by some companies (Amin, 
2017). However, these are known not to work very well in contexts where enforcement is 
weak, such as in many developing countries. Integrity pacts may be more effective if CSOs 
and the media are better able to hold the government to account.  
Other strategies listed by UNDP (2011) include ensuring that: a clear policy is set out on the 
methodology for quantification of supplies; the closing date of all procurement bids is 
adhered to; all bids are recorded; all awards and adjudication decisions are made by the 
procurement committee or tender board; all procurement tender bids and the results of 
contract awards are published online; electronic bidding is used where possible; suppliers 
are pre-qualified (e.g. through the WHO pre-qualification programme); prices of supplies are 
monitored; prices are checked against international benchmarks; international guidelines 
are used for health supply procurement practices; there is regular reporting of key 
procurement performance indicators; expert committees are commissioned to offer 
oversight to all procurement processes; and procurement officers are provided technical 
assistance and training. Finally, Ghana together with seven other non-Anglophone SSA 
countries attributed improvements in their pharmaceutical procurement processes to their 
membership of the Medicine Transparency Alliance (MeTA) (UNDP, 2011). 
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4. Discussion 
Our review has identified different forms of pharmaceutical procurement corruption 
happening across SSA. Although reports of bribery/extortion/kickbacks and bid rigging 
dominate the literature (Open Briefing, 2013; Heggstaf and Froystad, 2011), we have also 
found reports of license/certificate forgery, theft of supplies, inaccurate supply reports and 
quantification, avoidance of e-procurement procedures, state capture by powerful suppliers, 
and conflicts of interests (Amin, 2017; Arney et al., 2014; Olugbenga, 2013).  
Complex networks of players are involved in the different forms of corruption throughout 
the procurement process, but government officials and pharmaceutical companies and their 
agents are frequently identified as complicit. Procurement contracts are not awarded 
meritoriously; instead, officials award procurement contracts to their cronies or to bidders 
who pay bribes or offer kickbacks (Heggstaf and Froystad, 2011). Sometimes, the decision-
making apparatus of the state are captured by powerful suppliers who dictate procurement 
regulations to suit their bidding (Olugbenga, 2014).  
The quest for private benefits, mostly in pecuniary terms, is a major driver of corruption in 
pharma procurement. In Anglophone SSA, one of the poorest regions of the globe where 
financial resources are scarce and wages are comparatively low, the pressure to meet 
economic demands can force people to use both legitimate and illegitimate means. Similar 
drivers have also been reported by Behr (2017) in high-income European countries, and 
Blackstone et al. (2014) report significant proliferation of counterfeit medicine in the United 
States. However, we have previously suggested that the significant financial pressures in SSA 
may cause officials and other connected players to break the rules and that the 
consequences may be harsher for people in this region characterised by low quality of life 
(Onwujekwe et al., 2018). 
Other macro- and micro-level drivers have also been revealed in the literature that tend to 
sustain corruption. At the macro level, issues include weak enforcement of procurement 
policies, poor welfare for procurement staff, unregulated bidding and awarding of contracts, 
complicit media involvement, lack of participation by CSOs or CSOs playing politics with their 
roles, employment of unqualified persons in the procurement chain, workplace policies 
around targets, and a dearth of infrastructure including information and communication 
technology to facilitate e-procurement practices (Amin, 2017; Arney et al., 2014; Ekeigwe, 
2019; Garuba et al., 2009). At the micro level, the literature reports unethical attitudes 
among procurement staff, information asymmetry, and social ties including gender and 
marital status (Chuku et al., 2016; Vian, 2008; Yadav, 2015).  
It is clear that macro- and micro-level drivers of pharmaceutical procurement corruption can 
overlap, however, leading to the perpetuation of corruption. For instance, a staff member who 
faces marital responsibilities and whose welfare is poorly attended to by the government 
could be motivated to take bribes. Pharma reps who are pressured to meet targets set by their 
employers could bribe pharmaceutical officials in hospitals, or exploit the social ties they share 
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with hospital officials to help them meet their targets. Such complex relationships make this 
kind of corruption quite difficult to tackle (Conway et al., 2019; Ekeigwe, 2019).  
For a low-resource region that is grappling with several negative health outcomes 
(Kamorudeen and Bidemi, 2012; Onwujekwe et al., 2020), corruption in pharmaceuticals 
obviously has grave impacts. It limits the supplies of medicines to those in need through 
inflated costs, hoarding, inappropriate prescribing, counterfeit medicines, and frequent 
and/or artificial stock-outs. Invariably, these consequences can destabilise government 
efforts to strengthen health systems and can have a particular impact on health insurance. 
Expensive medication especially in low-income countries force health maintenance 
organisations (third party health insurance companies) to become less willing to pay for 
unduly expensive medication, or alternatively increase the cost of insurance, making it more 
difficult for poorer persons to get health coverage (Zweifel, Krey, & Tagli, 2007). Loss of 
public confidence in the health system can also emerge, which leads to increased 
government spend on disease prevention and responses in light of changes to health-
seeking behaviours. The overall effect of poor pharmaceutical procurement practices is that 
it stalls the achievement of universal health coverage (UNDP, 2011), as the cost of medicines 
will soar and/or access to quality medicines declines.   
4.1. Lessons learned from existing anti-corruption 
strategies 
Our review found several suggestions of how to curb different aspects of corruption within 
the pharmaceutical sector in Anglophone SSA. Although evidence on effective interventions 
is scarce, lessons can be drawn from particular success stories. For instance, UNDP (2011) 
reports improvements in Ghana’s pharmaceutical procurement system since the country 
joined MeTA and recommends MeTA membership for most countries, especially those in 
low-resource regions. Another intervention with evidence is the local production of 
medicines, and essential medicines in particular. Siyanbola et al. (2012) put forward that this 
has made the procurement chain less complex and easier to monitor in some countries in 
Asia and North Africa, while Conway et al. suggest that this can be effective for countries 
that largely import their medicines. Siyanbola et al. (2012) go on to suggest how countries 
can best commence local production of medicines by partnering with academia and funding 
research, which is lacking across countries such as Nigeria. Looking for ways to simplify the 
procurement chain is echoed in several studies (Enyinda et al., 2010; Enyinda and Tolliver, 
2019; Heggstad and Froystad, 2011; Webb, 2014). These scholars believe that identifying 
corruption flashpoints and effectively monitoring the different components of the 
procurement chain will result in a less complex chain and that context-specific anti-
corruption efforts are likely to be more effective. 
Building capacity around modern procurement practices, such as e-procurement systems 
and advancing standard procurement guidelines (open contracting and comparing prices of 
medicines and the essential medicines list against international benchmarks) could also hold 
promise in the development of efficient anti-corruption strategies. The idea here is to limit 
human interaction, which is a key conduit for various corrupt practices such as bribery and 
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extortion, and also to build a culture of transparency across the procurement chain (Amin, 
2017; Management Sciences for Health, 2012: Ch.1; Yadav, 2015).  
The Media and CSOs have important roles to play around the issue of transparency and 
equity too. They can provide oversight and independent checks and balances for the actions 
of the government and suppliers or companies – the media and CSOs can report 
malpractices, speak in favour of the masses, translate technical language to non-technical 
and accessible content, supervise the signing of integrity pacts, and shame defaulters to 
deter corrupt actors. Although Abba-Aji et al. (2020) caution that the media in Nigeria and 
similar contexts can be seen as corrupt too, they advise the media to report corruption in 
health systems so as to raise awareness and visibility within the national agenda.    
A further strategy that has already been found beneficial in the Ukraine (Amin, 2017) is to 
outsource the procurement of medicines to international organisations. Over time, this will 
enable the transfer of technical skills and knowledge to countries that are inexperienced in 
procurement, including in areas of leadership and good governance (Arney et al., 2014; 
Baghdadi-Sabeti and Serhan, 2010). Indeed, evidence already exists to show the effects of 
good governance in the procurement of pharmaceuticals in Nigeria, especially in curbing the 
production and supply of counterfeit medicines (Garuba et al., 2009).  
In conclusion, it is important to realise that corruption can manifest in different forms within 
different contexts. However, our synthesised findings show that similar structural and 
governance challenges exist across many Anglophone SSA countries that make it difficult to 
operate a transparent pharmaceutical procurement process. This knowledge suggests that 
countries could work together and learn lessons to tackle pharmaceutical procurement 
corruption at both regional and national levels and that effective coalitions lie at the heart of 
anti-corruption efforts.    
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Annexes 
Table A1: Summary of corruption in pharmaceutical procurement in sub-Saharan Africa 
S/N Country No. of 
papers 
Types of corruption in 
procurement of 
pharmaceuticals 
Explored in which studies?  Main drivers of corruption 
in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
Explored in which studies? Main interventions to eliminate 
corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
Explored in which studies? 
1 Nigeria 38 Inflation of figures; bribes, 
kickbacks or gifts given to 
physicians or pharmacists to 
promote certain brands; 
conflict between generic 





of clinical trial results and 
manipulation of essential 
drugs list; bid rigging and 




Chuku et al. (2016); Open 
Briefing (2013); Mackey & 
Liang (2012); Garuba et al. 
(2009); Amin (2017); 
Management Sciences for 
Health (2012); Buowari 
(2017); Vian (2008); Tomusa 
& Idom (2016) 
Importation of essential 
medicines; information 
asymmetry; insufficient 
policies and procedures for 
drug registration and 
selection committees; 
absence of conflict-of-
interest policy; huge 
finances within the 
pharmaceutical sector; state 
capture; poor recording and 
regulatory oversights; large 
informal markets; targets 
given to pharm reps; poorly 
designed procurement 
procedures; poorly funded 
and staffed National Drug 
Agency; profiteering; an 
excessively complex supply 
chain; newly transitioned 
countries from receivers of 
donations to purchasing; 
weak/poorly enforced 
sanctions; lack of insurance 
Siyanbola et al. (2012); 
Baghdadi & Serhan (2010); 
Chuku et al. (2016); Diack et 
al. (2010); Amadi & Tsui 
(2018); UNDP (2011); 
Garuba et al. (2009); 
Cartwright & Baric (2018); 
Enyinda & Tolliver (2009); 
Olugbenga (2014); Tormusa 
& Idom (2016); Olugbenga 
(2013); Arney et al. (2014); 
Onwujekwe et al. (2018); 
Ekeigwe (2019); Yadav 
(2015); Arney & Yadav 




Group Against Money 
Laundering in West Africa 
(2017) 
Improving tendering procedures 
and enforcing competitive bidding; 
include procurement principles in 
the constitution; prevent conflict 
of interests; electronic payment 
modes and electronic bidding; 
local production of essential 
medicines; open contracting; 
synergy with other anti-corruption 
bodies; adequate training of law 
enforcement and regulatory 
officials; whistleblowing policy; 
publish data in public domain; use 
CSOs and media effectively; 
common identification for drugs; 
regulate and address targets for 
pharm reps; partnership with 
MeTA; improve welfare of workers 
and employ more hands; adopt 
WHO pre-qualification programme 
and other international 
benchmarks; stiffer sanctions; 
feedback mechanisms from end-
users; check informal markets 
through their unions; integrity 
pacts; outsourcing; adopting a 
register of beneficial ownership; 
technical coaching for newly 
transitioned countries 
Mubangizi & Sewpersad 
(2017); Siyanbola et al. (2012); 
Peresson (2019); Baghdadi & 
Serhan (2010); Enwerema & 
Ifejika (2017); Chattopadhyay 
(2013); Chuku et al. (2016); 
Diack et al. (2010); Amadi & 
Tsui (2018); UNDP (2011); 
Akinyande (2013); Open 
Briefing (2013); Garuba et al. 
(2009); Cartwright & Baric 
(2018); Enyinda & Tolliver 
(2009); Enyinda et al. (2010); 
Ogbonna & Nwako (2016); 
Oyebamiji (2018); Olugbenga 
(2014); Tormusa & Idom 
(2016); Olugbenga (2013); 
Amin (2017); Huff-Rouselle 
(2012); Management Sciences 
for Health (2012); Ogbonna et 
al. (2015); Arney et al. (2014); 
Webb (2014); Onwujekwe et 
al. (2018); Ekeigwe (2019); 
Yadav (2015); Arney & Yadav 
(2014); Conway et al. (2019); 
USAID (2013); Bah-Traore 
(2012); Intergovernmental 
Action Group Against Money 
Laundering in West Africa 
(2017); Vian (2008); Tougher et 
al. (2012); Alayande et al. 
(2016) 
Corruption in the procurement of pharmaceuticals in Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa: a scoping literature review 
25 
S/N Country No. of 
papers 
Types of corruption in 
procurement of 
pharmaceuticals 
Explored in which studies?  Main drivers of corruption 
in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
Explored in which studies? Main interventions to eliminate 
corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
Explored in which studies? 




facilitation payments, rigged 
specifications, document 
falsification, market division, 
nepotism, and use of 
informal networks; conflict 
of interest; manipulating 
results of clinical trials 
Heggstad & Froystad (2011); 
Egharevba & Atkinson 
(2016) 
Poorly regulated distribution 
chain; weak monitoring of 
non-reimbursable 
medicines; poor logistics; 
insufficient IT infrastructure; 
huge finances in the 
pharmaceutical sector; state 
capture; inappropriate 
quantification; information 
asymmetry; social ties; low 
pay/wages 
Kanavos & Wouters (2014); 
Diack et al. (2010); Cohen et 
al. (2007); Heggstad & 
Froystad (2011); Sarpong et 
al. (2017a); Abgenorku 
(2012) 
Control non-reimbursable 
medicines; regulate mark-ups; 
improve logistics; improve IT 
infrastructure; improve health 
insurance services; partner with 
MeTA; report compliance and 
non-compliance in the public 
domain; make procurement 
details easily accessible; partner 
with the media and CSOs; red-
flagging; stiff sanctions; adopt 
international benchmarks; 
provide technical assistance and 
training to procurement officers 
Kanavos & Wouters (2014); 
Diack et al. (2010); Bigdeli et al. 
(2013); Kishore et al. (2015); 
Egharevba & Atkinson (2016); 
Sarpong et al. (2017a); Sarpong 
et al. (2017b); UNDP (2011); 
Adusei (2018); Tougher et al. 
(2012) 
3 Ethiopia  1 Bidding irregularities Gebremariam & Unade 
(2019) 
Non-employment of 
pharmacists at several 
decision points of the chain; 
Weak usage of electronic 
processes 
Gebremariam & Unade 
(2019) 
The right technical mix at decision 
points and digitalization of the 
procurement chain 
Gebremari & Unade (2019) 
4 Sierra 
Leone 
2 Kickbacks; overbilling; fraud 
in the selection process; 
theft; bribes 
Mostert et al. (2015) Informal black market; weak 
monitoring throughout the 
procurement processes; 
poor logistics 
Mostert et al. (2015) Effective monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms; 
feedbacks from end-users 
Amnesty International (2011) 
5 South 
Africa 
7 Inflating figures; kickbacks 
and bribery; theft; 
embezzlement; falsification 
of information or mis-
information; supplying 
counterfeit or sub-standard 
medicines; irregular 
biddings 
Gaitonde et al. (2016); 
Bateman (2013); Rispel et al. 




; poor enforcement of rules 




 Rispel et al. (2016); 
Madgadzire et al. (2017) 
Fair and transparent tendering 
procedures; competitive bidding; 
addressing conflict of interests; 
enforce electronic payments; 
partner with CSOs and the media; 
improve the welfare of 
procurement staff; employ 
competent staff; reduce 
discretion by dividing tasks; 
monitor the procurement 
processes 
Mubangizi & Sewpersadh 
(2017); Pillay & Mantzaris 
(2018); Gaitonde et al. (2016); 
Steyn et al. (2009); Rispel et al. 
(2016) 
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S/N Country No. of 
papers 
Types of corruption in 
procurement of 
pharmaceuticals 
Explored in which studies?  Main drivers of corruption 
in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
Explored in which studies? Main interventions to eliminate 
corruption in pharmaceutical 
procurement 
Explored in which studies? 
7 Uganda 5 Theft and re-sale of drugs Ntayi et al. (2013); UNDP 
(2011) 
Incompetent staff mix; weak 
application of rules and 
nepotism; the lack of 
inventory systems, clear 
policies, price list and 
oversight mechanisms; 
lucrative nature of supply; 
conflict of interest 
Ntayi et al. (2013); Bouchard 
et al. (2012) 
Fair and transparent tendering 
procedures; using IT 
infrastructure; addressing conflict 
of interests; improving health 
insurance; addressing 
inappropriate quantification 
Mubangizi & Sewpersadh 
(2017); Namisango et al. 
(2016); Bouchard et al. (2012); 
Seidman & Atun (2017); 
Tougher et al. (2012); Tumwine 
et al. (2010) 
8 Kenya 2 Assigning contracts to 
companies with known 
history of deficiency and 
delay in supply 
Tren et al. (2009) Bureaucracy and 
transportation challenges 
Muhia et al. (2017) Enforce electronic payments; 
outsourcing; transparent and fair 
tendering and contracting 
procedures; stiff sanctions 
Mubangizi & Sewpersadh 
(2017); Tren et al. (2009) 
9 Botswana 1 Bidding and tendering 
irregularities 
Mubangizi & Sewpersadh 
(2017) 
Conflict of interest Mubangizi & Sewpersadh 
(2017) 
Address conflict of interests; 
Enforce digitalisation of the 
procurement process 
Mubangizi & Sewpersadh 
(2017) 
10 Rwanda 1 Theft and embezzlement Serneels & Lieven (2018) Insufficient reward; poor 
monitoring and weak 
accountability systems 
Serneels & Lieven (2018) Training procurement officials on 
ethics; putting out procurement 
information in public domain for 
accountability reasons 
Serneels & Lieven (2018) 
11 Tanzania 4 Bribery/extortion; bidding 
and tendering irregularities 
Sabot et al. (2009) Poor logistics Kabote (2017) Scale up health insurance; 
improve the welfare of 
procurement staff; employ 
competent workforce; improve 
infrastructure around 
procurement 
Sabot et al. (2009); Jairo 






1     Globally coordinated surveillance 
system; extensive public 
enlightenment; Review of existing 
legislations; strong political will 
and enforcement of legislation; 
Determination and commitment 
to implement agreed health 
treaties; partnerships 
Aminu and Gwarzo (2017) 
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Table A2: Percentage distribution of country-by-country literature and key findings 
S/N Country Percentage  
(n = 72) 
Types of corruption Drivers of corruption Anti-corruption strategies 





Policy and infrastructural gaps and 
lack of enforcement of rules and 
sanctions; information asymmetry; 
complex procurement chain; poor 
staff welfare; employment 
irregularities; pharm reps’ targets; 
lucrative pharmaceutical sector; 
newly transitioned countries from 
donor receivers to purchasers; state 
capture 
Less complex procurement chain; 
digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards; advancing staff welfare; 
open contracting; effective 
partnerships with media, CSOs, etc.; 
adopting international benchmarks; 
technical coaching for newly 
transitioned countries; infrastructural 
development 





Policy and infrastructural gaps and 
lack of enforcement of rules and 
sanctions; information asymmetry; 
poor staff welfare; lucrative 
pharmaceutical sector; state capture; 
poorly trained procurement officials 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards; advancing staff welfare; 
open contracting; effective 
partnerships with media, CSOs, MeTA 
etc.; adopting international 
benchmarks; infrastructural 
development; training of procurement 
officers 
3 South Africa 7 (10%) Bidding and tendering 
irregularities; 
bribery/extortion; 
nepotism; supply of 
bad medicines 
Policy gaps and lack of enforcement 
of rules and sanctions; state capture; 
poor staff welfare 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards; advancing staff welfare; 
effective partnerships with media, 
CSOs, etc.; training of procurement 
officers; reduce discretion by dividing 
tasks 
4 Uganda 5 (7%) Theft and re-sale of 
drugs 
Policy gaps and lack of enforcement 
of rules and sanctions; lucrative 
supplies; conflict of interest; 
incompetent procurement staff 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards; training of procurement 
officers and appropriate employment 
5 Tanzania 4 (6%) Bribery/extortion; 
bidding and tendering 
irregularities 
Poor infrastructure; incompetent 
procurement staff; poor staff welfare 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards; advancing staff welfare; 
training of procurement officers 




Poor infrastructure; complex 
procurement chain 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards 
7 S Leone 2 (3%) Bribery; theft; bidding 
and tendering 
irregularities 
Poor infrastructure; complex 
procurement chain 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards; effective partnerships with 
media, CSOs, etc.; reduce discretion by 
dividing tasks 
8 Ethiopia 1 (1%) Bidding and tendering 
irregularities 
Incompetent staff; policy gaps and 
lack of enforcement of rules and 
sanctions 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards 
9 Botswana 1 (1%) Bidding and tendering 
irregularities 
Policy gaps and lack of enforcement 
of rules and sanctions 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards 
10 Rwanda 1 (1%) Theft and 
embezzlement 
Policy gaps and lack of enforcement 
of rules and sanctions; poor rule-
compliant attitude of procurement 
officials 
Digitalisation of procurement process; 
enforcement of regulations and 
standards; training procurement 
officials on ethics 
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